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Two steps forward, one step back: advance care planning, Australian regulatory 
frameworks and the AMA 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The AMA has recently adopted a policy position concerning advance care planning, 
which is generally supportive of extending patient self-determination beyond the loss of 
decision-making capacity.  It calls for uniform national legislation for legally enforceable 
advance health directives (AHDs), and statutory protection for practitioners who comply 
with valid AHDs, or who do not comply on a number of grounds.  Analysis of the 
grounds for non-compliance indicate that they undermine patient autonomy, and aspects 
of the policy are inconsistent with current common law and statutory regimes that allow 
an adult to complete a legally binding AHD.  The policy therefore threatens the patient 
self-determination which it endorses, and places doctors who participate in advance care 
planning at legal risk. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The Australian Medical Association (AMA) recently adopted a position statement 
entitled The Role of the Medical Practitioner in Advance Care Planning – 2006.1  The 
statement discusses the use of advance health directives (AHDs) and the appointment of  
persons (attorneys) with power to make health care decisions on behalf of incompetent 
patients.  The statement  
 
• recognises that advance care planning (ACP) plays an important role in 
advancing patient self-determination, and that it can reduce stress on families 
involved in making health care decisions;  
• predicts an increase in prevalence of ACP as Australia’s population ages; and 
• recommends uniform national legislation for legally enforceable AHDs,  
guidelines on preparation and implementation of AHDs, and statutory protection 
of practitioners. 
 
Despite these endorsements, the AMA has misunderstood and/or misapplied some of the 
fundamental ethical and legal principles which underpin ACP. This is illustrated 
primarily by the policy’s proposal to allow doctors to ignore an AHD when the doctor 
believes that the AHD is ‘inconsistent with good medical practice or advances in medical 
science, thereby preserving doctors’ clinical judgement and discretion’.2  We argue that 
the concepts of good medical practice, judgement and discretion, together with other 
terms and emphases in the statement, are problematic, and undermine its stated support 
for patient autonomy.  Furthermore, the policy’s endorsement of doctors’ discretion is at 
odds with the law in most Australian jurisdictions, and places doctors at legal risk. 
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Discussion 
 
 
What is ACP? 
 
ACP is the preparation for ‘likely scenarios near the end of life, which ordinarily includes 
assessment of, and dialogue about, a person’s understanding of their medical history and 
condition, values, preferences, and personal and family resources’.3  It necessarily 
involves health professionals in a treatment team working together with the patient, or 
alternatively, the patient’s substitute decision-makers, to chart a course regarding the 
patient’s future care. The AMA position statement defines ACP as a process that allows a 
competent individual to express their views in relation to future health care decisions 
when the capacity to express those views is lost (paragraph 2.1).  
  
ACP can include the use of AHDs which document the patient’s own consent to or (more 
commonly) refusal of particular or general types of treatment, which are relevant to the 
patient’s preferences and prognosis.  More commonly, ACP involves the use of a 
substitute decision-maker, whether that person is appointed by a Tribunal to make health 
care decisions, by the patient under an enduring power of attorney (also called enduring 
guardianship), or is deemed to be the decision maker by the relevant statute. If the patient 
becomes incapable of making decisions, the substitute decision-maker is then asked by 
the treatment team to consider the treatments that are offered and to consent to or refuse 
treatment according to, among other things, his or her best estimate of how the patient 
would have decided in the circumstances. 
 
The ethical underpinnings of ACP lie in the concern for patient autonomy. ‘This principle 
holds that persons should be free to determine what happens to them, and therefore free 
to accept or refuse treatment’.4  The legal underpinnings of ACP lie in the doctrine of 
bodily integrity which states that the merest touching of another person’s body without 
consent is a battery. This common law rule also supports the principle of informed 
consent and the use of AHDs. The common law thus protects a fundamental human right. 
 
 
Current legal status of ACP in Australia 
 
The law has endorsed ACP by according statutory status to AHDs and the appointment of 
substitute decision-makers. 
 
(a) AHDs 
AHDs are recognized by common law (See Box 1). While there are no Australian cases 
that have considered when a common law AHD will be valid, it appears that the basic 
requirements for a valid common law AHD are: 
 
1. The patient is competent when s/he makes the directive; 
2. The directive is not procured through the undue influence of others;5, 6  
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3. The directive clearly applies to the circumstances that have arisen. 
 
The failure to comply with a valid common law AHD may result in a claim for battery, or 
a criminal charge.7, 8 
 
A number of jurisdictions have also passed legislation that recognises AHDs (see Table 
1). These regimes ordinarily preserve the right of patients to make common law 
directives. They also tend to be more restrictive than common law directives by limiting 
the effectiveness of the AHD to situations of ‘current conditions’ or where the patient is 
terminally ill.  
 
AHDs have a role to play in ACP particularly in patient groups with chronic conditions, 
where the trajectory of illness, and the variety of treatments, are relatively certain. They 
will especially be useful for those patients without family or friends to call upon to be 
substitute decision-makers, or those who would prefer not to involve such people in the 
ACP process.  Finally, AHDs are also commonly used by people with religious beliefs or 
strongly held beliefs against types of treatment. It is no accident that the majority of cases 
legally reported concerning AHDs involve Jehovah’s Witnesses. 
 
The statutes also provide protection, in certain circumstances, to a health professional 
who does not comply with a directive.  Protection is generally afforded where the 
directive is uncertain, there has been a change of circumstances since the directive was 
given, or the adult has revoked (or intends to revoke) the directive.  In most jurisdictions, 
however, the fact that the directive is contrary to a health professional’s view of what is 
in the best interest of the adult is irrelevant, and a health professional is not excused for 
not following it on this ground.  Queensland is the one exception.  There, a health 
professional may choose not to follow a directive if he or she believes that it is 
inconsistent with good medical practice.9  At present, notions of best interest may thus be 
relevant in Queensland. 
 
(b) Enduring Powers of Attorney (EPA) and other provisions for substitute decision-
making 
In the past, health professionals were entitled to do whatever they considered to be in the 
best interests of adults who became incompetent and needed treatment, under the legal 
doctrine of necessity. Alternatively, consent could be sought from the courts and 
guardianship authorities.  
 
To rectify these somewhat clumsy arrangements, and in recognition of the greater social 
acceptance of personal autonomy, most Australian jurisdictions passed laws which 
empowered various kinds of substitute decision-makers.  A substitute decision-maker is 
someone who has legal authority to make decisions on behalf of a person who no longer 
has decision-making capacity.  Tribunals can appoint a person to make health decisions 
for the patient (commonly referred to as a “guardian”).  The patient himself or herself 
may appoint a person to make health decisions, commonly an “enduring guardian” or 
“attorney”. In the absence of either appointment, most statutes provide that a person close 
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to the patient is the decision-maker, commonly called a “person responsible” or “statutory 
health attorney”.  
 
It is usually the case that a decision about treatment that is made by a substitute decision-
maker has the same legal effect as if it had been made by the patient.  In other words, it 
operates as a valid consent or refusal, and will be as binding on the health professional as 
if a competent patient gave the consent or refusal.  Generally speaking, if a patient has 
made both an AHD and has a substitute decision-maker, the substitute decision-maker is 
bound to follow the AHD. 
 
The legal regimes of EPAs are also summarised in Table 1.  
 
 
Patient autonomy and doctors’ legal risks 
 
We commend the AMA policy for its general support for ACP and its underpinning 
moral principle, the advancement of patient self-determination beyond the loss of 
decision-making capacity.  We also support the policy’s call for uniform national 
legislation for legally enforceable AHDs, mutual recognition of ACP instruments, and 
guidelines for preparation, storage and implementation of AHDs.  Advice regarding the 
regular review of advance care plans and directives, and the provision of statutory 
protection to practitioners complying with AHDs, in order to provide greater confidence 
in implementing the wishes of patients, is unexceptionable.  So too is the recognition that 
compliance with AHDs is conditional on establishing their validity. 6    However, some 
portions of the policy statement undermine its stated support for patient autonomy, and 
some may cause confusion for doctors, whom it encourages to become familiar with the 
relevant law.10 Unfortunately, that law is not accurately reflected in the policy in the 
following ways. 
 
(a) Inconsistent approaches to autonomy - While upholding the competent patient’s right 
to make health care decisions, the policy states that once decision-making capacity is lost, 
the competent patient’s anticipatory decision-making “can have a role”.11 This far from 
explicit phrase suggests a difference in the AMA’s approach to competent and 
incompetent patients.  That is, the AMA recognises patient autonomy absolutely if the 
patient is competent, but it is only one consideration if the patient has become 
incompetent.   There is no ethical or legal basis on which to make such a distinction.  
Laws on ACP were enacted to sustain the status of patient autonomy into the future.  
 
(b) Usefulness of AHDs – At paragraph 3.8, the policy states that AHDs would be 
particularly useful in extreme situations including the terminal phase of a terminal illness, 
persistent vegetative state or coma, and permanent need for life-sustaining treatment or 
lack of any reasonable prospect for regaining capacity.12  We question the implication 
that AHDs would not be particularly useful in other settings, for example the early stage 
of a terminal illness, a person with a severe disability who does not want to be 
resuscitated following an acute event, or an elderly person who, for carefully considered 
reasons, does not wish to have their dying prolonged by use of artificial nutrition and 
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hydration. Emphasising the usefulness of AHDs in extreme situations like the ones 
described overstates the relative importance of the sanctity of life vis a vis patient self-
determination. 
 
(c) Problems with Good Medical Practice - As we have said, the law indicates that not 
following an AHD may constitute an assault and have civil and criminal consequences, 
but at paragraph 1.4, the policy statement says that (1) a doctor should be able to ignore a 
directive if it is considered to be inconsistent with good medical practice or advances in 
medical science, (2) this will preserve doctors’ clinical judgement and discretion, and (3) 
doctors following this path should receive statutory protection.  This is highly contentious 
guidance, especially considering that it is intended to apply nationally. Queensland is the 
only state that allows the doctor to override an AHD on this ground.  
 
The AMA policy also erroneously links a patient’s change in circumstances with “good 
medical practice”.  At paragraph 4.1(a), the policy suggests that if the circumstances have 
changed, the AHD may no longer apply.  It then goes on to suggest, at paragraph 4.2, that 
doctors should not be under a legal obligation to follow an AHD that is not consistent 
with good medical practice.  These issues are, however, quite distinct from a legal and a 
clinical perspective.  In fact, the law generally provides that an AHD will not operate if 
the circumstances have altered since its completion, so that the patient would not have 
intended it to apply in the changed circumstances.  This is unrelated to good medical 
practice.  Allowing a health professional to not follow an AHD because it is inconsistent 
with good medical practice raises an entirely different issue.  
 
The statement defines Good Medical Practice as having regard to the recognised medical 
standards, practices and procedures of the medical profession in Australia, and the 
recognised ethical standards of the medical profession in Australia.  The definition is 
taken from Queensland’s Powers of Attorney Act 1998 and Guardianship and 
Administration Act 2000.9, 13  In a review of that legislation, it has been pointed out that 
formal national guidelines that embody the recognised medical and ethical standards, 
practices and procedures regarding circumstances in which life-sustaining measures can 
properly be withheld or withdrawn, do not exist.14  There is some guidance to be gained 
from departmental policies, position statements from some Colleges and the AMA policy 
on the Care of Severely Ill and Terminally ill Patients.15 But these are hardly concrete 
enough to function as good practice guidelines, and one is left wondering how doctors’ 
clinical judgment and discretion is to operate in these circumstances.   
 
(d) Conflict between the policy and AMA Code of Ethics - The AMA’s principal ethical 
guidelines concerning patient self-determination are ambiguous. In the AMA Code of 
ethics, doctors are enjoined to respect patients’ rights to accept or reject advice and to 
make their own decisions about treatment or procedures, and (in relation to dying 
patients), to respect their autonomy regarding management including the refusal of 
treatment, but they are also instructed to first consider the well-being of their patients (our 
emphasis).16  This primary consideration of well-being, or best medical interests, if 
applied in ACP cases, would contradict the law’s clear requirement for a health 
professional to follow a valid AHD (with the possible exception of Queensland).  It 
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would also be inconsistent with the law’s equal treatment of advance and 
contemporaneous refusals of medical treatment, remembering that doctors have no 
latitude to exercise judgement and discretion in the contemporaneous setting, to override 
competent patients’ decisions. As we have argued, any case of the latter inconsistency 
would constitute discrimination against (now) incompetent people in relation to the 
competent. 
 
The policy statement further muddies the waters for doctors by saying that the AMA 
respects the rights of doctors to hold differing views regarding AHDs, and that doctors 
should be under no obligation to follow an AHD to which they hold a conscientious 
objection.17  This too is inconsistent with doctors’ ethical and legal obligations in 
response to competent contemporaneous refusals of treatment.18  We are not aware of 
conscientious objections being raised by doctors in the face of such refusals, or of any 
relevant policies supporting such a discretion.  Doctors are legally bound to comply with 
competent refusals of treatment.  What kind of conscientious objection does the AMA 
contemplate a doctor might raise to the implementation of a valid and legally enforceable 
AHD?   
 
(e) Calls for open-ended legislation - The AMA’s statement urges that doctors’ clinical 
judgement and discretion would also be preserved by the enactment of legislation which 
would allow them not to comply with an AHD if they have reasonable grounds to believe 
it is inconsistent with advances in medical science.  This is an excessively open-ended 
condition, which could result in non-compliance, even though the medical advance relied 
upon made little or no difference to procuring for the patient an acceptable quality of life.  
Considering that most people affected will be older, frail individuals, and that AHDs do 
not come into effect until the person has lost capacity, this is not a far-fetched concern.  
In addition, research demonstrates that most older people would prefer to run the small 
risk of missing out on medical breakthroughs than to run the much more likely risk of 
being treated against their will at the end of their lives.19 
 
(f) Reviewing AHDs is standard practice - Finally, doctors are advised in the statement 
that there are certain circumstances which may pose “serious ethical, clinical challenges 
to the health care team”.20  These include (a) a change in circumstances such as treatment 
options and patient preferences from the time of execution; (b) use of ambiguous terms in 
AHDs such as “heroic measures”and (c) difficulty in predicting every scenario and 
consequent inapplicability in existing circumstances.  We suggest that when these 
conditions obtain, no serious ethical, legal or clinical challenges to the health care team 
arise, since these are clear triggers for review and close scrutiny of treatment priorities.  
Health care team members simply need to be better educated about what the relevant law 
says on these issues and make the necessary inquiries.  This includes approaching the 
appointed or statutory attorney in an attempt to discern the meaning of the AHD, rather 
than ignoring it altogether and making a decision on the basis of good medical practice. 
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Conclusion 
 
The AMA should be congratulated for engaging in the discussion of ACP. Australia 
needs to continue that discussion. The addition of the AMA’s voice will strengthen the 
call for a uniform legislative scheme.  Nevertheless, the AMA has failed to take the rights 
of patients to refuse treatment in advance seriously enough. Health professionals do not 
and should not have the right to ignore their patients’ competent and clearly expressed 
wishes, merely because they feel uncomfortable with the choices that their patients make. 
It is a fundamental pillar of the doctor/patient relationship that it is the patient who 
ultimately holds the power to consent to or refuse treatment. Patients will not always be 
wise or intelligent, but competent patients always have the last say over what happens to 
their bodies. 
 
The AMA’s suggestion of a national legislative regime establishing AHDs as legally 
enforceable is to be commended, but its recommendations for discretionary exceptions 
are inconsistent with their established legal enforceability. Doctors should therefore be 
concerned by the advice provided by the position statement. If our analysis is accurate, 
doctors who use their discretion against the wishes of the patient, beyond those 
exceptions with which we have agreed, may well be relinquishing the protection which 
the existing statutes provide.   
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Box 1 
 
 
Classic cases of common law advance directives 
 
NHS Trust v T [2004] EWHC 1279 (Fam).  A 37-year old woman with borderline 
personality disorder made an AHD, refusing blood products because she believed her 
blood to be evil. She had a history of repeated blood-letting, causing chronic anaemia, 
which led on this occasion to emergency hospital admission. A judge asked to assess the 
validity of the directive felt that there was compelling evidence that the woman had not 
been competent at the time the directive was made.  
 
 
Malette v Schulman (1990) 67 DLR (4th) 321.  A woman presented to an emergency 
department with serious injuries and unconscious. Health professionals found a card on 
her person stating that she was a practising Jehovah’s Witness and that she refused to be 
given blood under any circumstances. The doctor decided to provide blood because he 
had been unable to discuss treatment options with the patient, and he believed her 
decision to refuse blood was uninformed. This argument was rejected by the court. The 
card was an effective means of communicating her refusal of blood and clearly applied to 
the circumstances that had arisen. A doctor was not free to disregard a patient’s decision 
merely because they had not had an opportunity to discuss the treatment options with the 
patient.  
  
B v an NHS Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam). After several months of no improvement in 
her condition, a quadriplegic and ventilator-dependent patient B, requested that the 
ventilation be withdrawn, having created an AHD to that effect. Part of the treatment 
team argued that B was depressed and hence incompetent, with the result that her wishes 
could be ignored and treatment continued. The judge rejected this argument, found B to 
be competent and completely free to request the withdrawal of treatment, and upheld her 
decision. Only nominal damages were ordered for the battery and B later died from the 
treatment withdrawal.  
 
HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] EWHC 1017 (Fam). A 24 year old female Jehovah’s 
Witness had signed an advance directive, but two years later had promised to convert to 
Islam after becoming engaged to a Muslim. The woman needed blood after an operation. 
The judge found the woman’s promise to convert to Islam to be an “essential and 
compelling aspect” for finding that the advance directive was no longer intended to 
apply. 
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Table 1:  Summary of Legislation Affecting End-of-Life Issues  
 
State Legislative 
AHD 
EPA Comments 
ACT 
 
YES YES Medical Treatment (Health Directions) Act 2006 : no requirement for condition to be current or terminal; appointed agent can 
refuse treatment. 
Powers of Attorney Act 2006: attorney can consent to the patient’s health care , which includes decisions to withhold or withdraw 
medical treatment. 
Guardianship and Management of Property Act 1991:  guardian can consent to lawful medical treatment which is necessary for 
the wellbeing of the donor or withholding or withdrawal of medical treatment (this requires attorneys to be fully informed of 
nature of  patient’s illness and options for treatment. 
 
New South 
Wales 
 NO YES Using Advance Care Directives (2004) - NSW Health policy document:  AHDs made according to document are common law 
AHDs & are legally binding.   Individuals may appoint enduring guardian, who may consent to treatments, provided this is for 
‘promoting and maintaining their health and well-being.’ Enduring guardians can also be given lawful instructions in their 
instruments, indicating that a quasi-AHD may be created  
NB: Doubt has recently been shed on the powers of enduring guardians, the Public Guardian and the Guardianship Tribunal to 
refuse treatment, in a recent case decided by the by the NSW Administrative Decisions Tribunal: WK v Public Guardian (No 2) 
[2006] NSWADT 121. However, the Guardianship Tribunal has since stated that substitute decision-maker can consent to the 
withholding and withdrawal of medical treatment: Re AG [2007] NSWGT 1. 
Northern 
Territory 
YES NO Natural Death Act 1988:  persons 18 years and over can make an AHD to refuse extraordinary treatment in event of terminal 
illness.   
Queensland 
 
YES YES Powers of Attorney Act 1998:  Allows AHD for consent to or refusal of treatment.  Requirements: 
(a) the principal is terminally ill and is not expected to live more than a year, or is in a persistent vegetative state, or is permanently 
unconscious, or has a severe illness with no reasonable prospect of being able to live without the continued application of life-
sustaining measures; and 
(b) (if the direction concerns artificial hydration or nutrition) the life sustaining measure would be inconsistent with good medical 
practice; and (c) the patient has no reasonable prospect of regaining capacity  for health matters. 
Guardianship & Administration Act 2000:   Allows for others including an attorney under an EPA to consent to 
withdrawing/withholding life-sustaining treatment, but may not consent to withdrawal of artificial feeding and hydration unless 
the treatment is inconsistent with good medical practice.  
South 
Australia 
YES YES Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995:  Person over 18 years can write AHD that refuses consent to medical 
treatment any time (i.e. anticipatory) but only for terminal illness.  
Allows for appointment of medical power of attorney.   Powers must be exercised 
(a) in accordance with any lawful conditions and directions contained in the medical power of attorney; and 
(b) if the grantor of the power has also given an anticipatory direction—consistently with the direction, and subject to those 
requirements, in what the agent genuinely believes to be the best interests of the grantor. 
Medical attorney cannot refuse natural administration of food and water, palliative care or treatment which would return the 
grantor to capacity. 
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The Guardianship & Administration Act 1993: Also allows for  appointment of an enduring guardian, who is bound: 
(a) to exercise powers at law or in equity of a guardian if the person who makes the appointment subsequently becomes mentally 
incapacitated; and 
(b) in that event, to consent or refuse consent to the medical or dental treatment of the person, except where the person has a 
medical agent available and willing to act in the matter. 
Tasmania 
 
NO YES Directions for Medical Treatment Bill 2005 (not enacted):  Allows an AHD for a current condition, but only where the patient has 
a terminal illness or is in persistent vegetative state.  
Guardianship and Administration Act 1995:  individuals may appoint enduring guardians, who must follow any lawful directions 
in instrument. Subject any direction concerning consent, they have power to consent or refuse treatment on an assessment of best 
interests of the patient 
Victoria YES YES Medical Treatment Act 1988:  Patient can write a “refusal of treatment” certificate, but only for a current illness which does not 
have to be terminal:  
Aso allows appointment of a medical agent who may consent to or refuse treatment. Agent may only refuse treatment on behalf of 
a patient if— 
(a) medical treatment would cause unreasonable distress to the patient; or 
(b) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the patient, if competent, and after giving serious consideration to his or her 
health and well-being, would consider that medical treatment is unwarranted. 
Agent may not refuse palliative care (which is defined to include the reasonable provision of food and water). Agents should not 
request withholding treatment unless they have been fully informed of nature of patient’s illness and options for treatment.  
Guardianship and Administration Act 1986:  Allows people to appoint an enduring guardian. If the instrument is silent on consent, 
the enduring guardian may consent to treatment in the patient’s best interests. 
Western 
Australia 
NO NO Acts Amendment (Consent to Medical Treatment) Bill 2006 (not yet enacted):  allows an AHD to be completed;  no requirement 
for a current condition or terminal illness. 
Bill also allows for the appointment of an enduring guardian with powers to consent to and refuse treatment 
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